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Chapter 12
Privacy Actors, Performances
and the Future of Privacy Protection
Charles Raab and Bert-Jaap Koops
12.1 Background
A large proportion of the scholarly work on privacy and data protection has focused
attention on the instruments or ‘tools’ that are, or that could be, used for regulating
the processing and flow of personal data. This important research has generated con-
siderable debate, criticism and (re)conceptualisation of the means whereby rights or
claims to privacy can be defended or promoted. Much of the discourse around data
protection has had to do with the merits or shortcomings of laws, directives, codes
of practice, privacy statements and seals, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs),
contracts, binding corporate rules, international agreements and treaties and so on
(e.g., Bennett and Raab, 2006).
Discussions of the instruments are sometimes partisan, reflecting, for example,
preferences for or against state control and pressures for self-regulation or for tech-
nological solutions. This should serve to remind us that designing the instruments
that are the ‘how’ of data protection is not a dispassionate technocratic process of
choosing tools to do a job but a political process in which there are many con-
flicts and interests, in which more than data protection is at stake. In particular,
the merits of, and relationship between, legal instruments and system architecture
or ‘code’ has held centre-stage as a principal topic of analysis (Lessig, 1999). The
emphasis on some instruments (e.g., self-regulatory codes of practice), which was
strong in American policy discourse, has faded somewhat from prominence in the
debates of the new century, although market-based or property solutions retain their
vigour to a large extent, in part reflecting frustration with the difficulty of regulat-
ing privacy through supra-individual institutional processes in a global information
environment.
The value of tools-oriented analysis is that it helps to clarify the ‘how’ and ‘what’
of information privacy protection and perhaps also the ‘what works?’ orientation of
policy-makers and practitioners. The expected further development of information
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and communication technologies (ICTs), as well as innovations in the application
of ICTs in economic production and consumption, in public administration and in
law enforcement and public order domains, are likely to bring forth new regulatory
instruments or new variations on older ones. No doubt, these will keep the schol-
arly industry alive. Although the pursuit of understanding in terms of regulatory
instrumentation is far from exhausted, we need to know more about the array of
instruments as an ensemble, or how each one functions as a component of a holis-
tic regulatory regime, both descriptively and in terms of possible improvements in
regulatory design (Bennett and Raab, 2006; Raab and De Hert, 2007, 2008).
But whilst further exploration of this is necessary, it is insufficient for achiev-
ing the aim of understanding regulation without bringing in a further dimension of
the analytical paradigm: the ‘who’ of privacy protection, considering both who are
the protectors and who are the protected. Moreover, just as we cannot understand
tools without seeing them in relation to each other, we cannot understand these
actors without understanding action; that is, the relationships and processes through
which actors come together in co-operation or conflict, whether to shape the tools,
use them, or avoid them. Regulators and other practitioners may understand these
dimensions very well and no doubt have well-developed views on who ought to take
part in the process, when and where.
If we are to point to the future, it may well be important to look a bit more
systematically at these dimensions, in order to see how improvements could be
made in the existing processes of decision-making, the patterns of responsibility
and accountability and the relationships amongst participants. It is arguable that the
problems of data protection, as well as the successes, are attributable in considerable
part to the participants or policy actors, to the roles they play and to the institu-
tions in which action takes place and not only to the instruments or tools that are
used to protect personal data. The focus of attention here is therefore on the policy
actors and the institutions they inhabit. It is also concerned with where these actors
and institutions are located in ‘policy space’, which comprises the governmental or
political arenas that exist within particular jurisdictions and at different levels from
the local to the global. We might say that that is the ‘where’ of privacy protection.
Moreover, because these relationships take place in real time, there is also a question
about ‘when’, which points up the element of ‘process’ more than just an account
of actors who do certain things. Whether it is the ‘what’, the ‘who’, the ‘where’ or
the ‘when’ of regulation that is under investigation, we should not lose sight of the
exercise of power as a crucial dimension of these phenomena. This points towards
other, more normative, aims of this paper: to consider the responsibilities of actors
and to evaluate performances, even if only in broad-brush terms, in order to show
the way to possible changes.
12.2 Mapping the Landscape of Actors
In regard both to instruments and levels or arenas, there is a very disjointed land-
scape that defies simple description or the easy reading of trends. This paper cannot
provide a comprehensive account of the expanding policy community for privacy
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and data protection but the available evidence is of a complex patterning of a
highly diverse and shifting array of groups, networks and other comings-together,
some more institutionalised than others, that have barely emerged as the subject
of contemporary systematic research. There may be a prospect of effective global
regulation or, on the other hand, an increasing incapability of existing and foresee-
able instruments and regulatory strategies. There is a range in-between these poles,
in which path-dependent patchworks of ad hoc tools, organisations and strategies
cope with problems, with some, but limited, success. These reflect the generations
of privacy protection from the 1970s to the present and thus encompass the historic
responses to major technological change, as well as accommodations or resistances
to privacy-unfriendly political and commercial initiatives.
It is now some 39 years since the establishment of the first regime for the
protection of personal data, that of the German Land of Hesse, which included a
regulatory agency headed by a privacy commissioner (Bennett, 1992). Since then,
there has been a proliferation of such organisations and officials across the world,
in individual countries and in smaller jurisdictions (i.e., within federal countries).
The history of developments in these jurisdictions need not be rehearsed here;
nor does the way each such regime has mixed and matched particular instruments
according to its own politically-driven estimate of the relative value of laws, codes
of practice, technological instruments and other tools or mechanisms in protecting
information privacy (see Bennett and Raab, 2006). These policy ‘choices’ have often
been driven by international legal requirements, policy learning and borrowing,
regulatory traditions and other pressures, as well as, perhaps, chance.
In the present context, it is more important to note that regulatory policies and
legislation have taken place at several levels, or jurisdictional arenas, which are sub-
stantially, albeit disjointedly, interrelated. Early on, information privacy protection
became a ‘project’ of an international informal group of prominent public officials
and academics in the 1970s and continued with a further concretisation of rules,
principles and guidelines established by institutions, notably the Council of Europe
and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 1980–1981.
These rules and principles shaped subsequent national and sub-national legislation
and continued into the second generation when national laws were aligned with
a further trans-national landmark in privacy protection, the European Union (EU)
Directive 95/46/EC in 1995, itself influenced by national practices and legal provi-
sions. These activities and rules have borne not only upon national jurisdictions but
upon sub-national ones as well and on the activities of the private (or at least, non-
state) sector of the economy in which personal data are processed. They, and perhaps
especially in recent years, the EU, have impinged upon many old members of the
club of information privacy regulation, such as the USA and Canada and on many
new entrants when they set up their laws and regulatory machinery for the first time,
such as the countries of Eastern and Central Europe and the non-Commonwealth
countries of the Pacific Rim.
As has just been indicated, there are prominent players in arenas above that of
the individual country: international formal organisations have been important from
early days onward and have generated some of the main international, authoritative
documents having regulatory force. These have helped to set the parameters for
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regulation, the understandings of privacy-related issues and the very means of reg-
ulation themselves. But new players among international organizations have come
along. At the global level, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has played a part
in shaping privacy protection in a context of international trade policy. The United
Nations, although not a new player, has also lent its moral force to the cause of pri-
vacy protection, although it has played little part in practical activity. Regionally, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) group of countries have formed regu-
lar relationships concerning information privacy protection, from which the APEC
privacy framework, albeit much criticised, has been a tangible outcome. In addition,
international organisations of other provenances have come into view as partici-
pants: global and European standardisation organisations are among the prominent
participants, although movement towards the development of world-wide privacy
standards has been halting. The movement for the creation of a privacy standard has
had its manifestations at national (e.g., Canada), European (CEN/ISSS) and broader
international (ISO) levels. Particularly in the ICT context, organisations like the
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) have also aimed at developing privacy stan-
dards, such as the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), although the degree of
success has not been very high.
Other international mechanisms fall somewhere between formal organisations
and networks; or rather, the same members operate in both kinds for different pur-
poses. It is in this context that account must be taken, not only of who does what
at what level but at the interaction of players across levels as they shape policy and
regulatory instruments. Under the European Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC,
the so-called Article 29 Working Party has been very prominent on the regulatory
landscape in the past decade. As a body that includes representatives of the EU
Member States’ supervisory authorities, it has produced many reports, opinions and
other relevant documents concerning a host of technological, policy and information
practice-related issues and operates in relation to other EU institutions. This is also
the place to note the formal establishment of the role and office of the European Data
Protection Supervisor (EDPS) within the EU, thus underlining the importance of the
European level of data protection activity and pointing towards an EU spokesperson
role vis-a`-vis the rest of the world.
The most visible and long-standing network of wide extent, going back some
thirty years, is the circle of the world’s privacy commissioners that has met annually
to compare experiences, to examine regulatory and technological developments and
to respond to (or perhaps procrastinate in the face of) immediate issues. This is
the maximal grouping, so far, for global regulation of privacy-invasive information
practices and of surveillance but it has yet to achieve an organisational presence
that persists from year to year. This perhaps exemplifies and signifies the general
inhibitions on the formation of global regulation and, in this example, the effect of
financial and organisational resource limitations, as well as national political and
legislative constraints upon the further development of commissioners’ roles. Par-
ticularly among some national commissions, it may also reflect a certain reluctance
to promote further institutionalisation and the pressures of collective decision-
making that such institutionalisation would entail. Over the years, in fact, the annual
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commissioners’ conference, held in different places across the globe, has produced
final communique´s and resolutions but often with apparent difficulty in concerting
views on issues of the day that affect the working of all in their national contexts, or
in agreeing on the very propriety of such concertation.
Just what the difficulties here have been, what explains them, and the perceived
prospects for overcoming them as international data protection moves into a future
marked by increasing surveillance-related threats to the privacy that the regimes
have been constructed to protect, should be among the main subjects of future
policy-oriented research. There are, however, some signs that this network may
become more institutionalised and bureaucratised, possibly spawning its own sec-
retariat and thus potentially operating in a more visible and regular way between
the annual occasions that have been hitherto organised on a rotating ad hoc basis.
There may possibly be a pay-off in terms of greater influence, or at least voice, in the
world’s arenas where policies are made that pose threats to privacy. These include
a number of data-gathering and surveillance activities that have proliferated at least
since the events of 11 September 2001 and that have put privacy protection on the
defensive (see, e.g., EPIC, 2006).
Within its orbit but not organisationally connected to it are smaller groupings
or networks of regulators taking a special interest in, for example, the field of
telecommunication and its privacy implications. There are also gatherings of Euro-
pean privacy commissioners (or similar titles) in larger or smaller groupings for
mutual learning and comparing experiences, based on regional, historic or other
affinities. These interactions include those of EU Member States, of the EEA and of
sub-jurisdictions in Germany, Switzerland and Spain, as well as of Jersey, Guernsey,
Cyprus, Malta and the Isle of Man; the expansion of the EU to include new Member
States in East and Central Europe has further ramified these patterns of interac-
tion. The first European Congress on Data Protection was held in March, 2006 in
Madrid. At the level of EU and European or world-level institutions, there are many
other comings-together of commissioners for various purposes: besides the activi-
ties of the Article 29 Working Party, important data-protection work is conducted
within Europol, Eurojust and Interpol. In all these processes and contexts there have
been many other participants apart from information or privacy commissioners but
the latter have been the most identifiable category or grouping, with some degree
of continuity and coherence manifested through their networks and more formal
arrangements.
Thus, during the decades in question, there have been increasing efforts to create
roles, networks and organisations of regulatory bodies and individual actors across
jurisdictional lines, with a particular concentration within Europe but with important
intercontinental linkages as well. There are also significant affinities and interchange
among agencies within particular linguistic groupings in the Francophonic and
Spanish-speaking worlds. Networks and ad hoc concentrations of a more specialised
sort have also been evident in domains in which privacy issues are prominent in rela-
tion to new ICT (e.g., telecommunications; radio frequency identification (RFID)) or
other developments in the fields of business and government. Taken together, these
and other formal or less formal arrangements beyond the national state resemble
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a kaleidoscope, in which the same pieces group and regroup periodically in the
course of time; the ‘usual suspects’ have the chance to come together frequently in
the rounds of meetings and other means of communication they use for dialogue,
deliberation and common action. Some of this club-like behaviour is carried out
publicly and transparently and the network boundaries are fairly penetrable by other
persons, who may work in privacy-related roles in other public bodies, private-sector
companies, academia and interest groups and who have relatively easy access to
some meetings and to the members of the ‘club’. We may note, also, the emergence
of international gatherings of the world’s freedom-of-information commissioners,
in ways that resemble their privacy counterparts; in some cases, these may be the
same persons (or at least the same regulatory authorities) wearing different hats.
Beyond those developments of the past few decades and of very recent years,
new roles and, indeed, careers and formal qualifications have proliferated in a host
of organisations such as firms and public agencies. These include data protection
or privacy officers, chief information officers and the like, who are charged with
responsibility for the legal compliance and good practice of their organisations and
who have developed institutional bases for their training, common learning, interest
co-ordination and representation. Their activities emanate from organisations, both
private and public, within countries and among prominent multinational firms and
represent a movement towards professionalism as well as policy interest and collec-
tive representation. There are now many thousand such persons on the scene; many
of them also intersect with, or even double up as, the officials responsible (in some
countries) for compliance with freedom-of-information in their organisations, given
the close relationship between, and even mutual entailment of, these two aspects of
information policy.
Further afield in the regulatory universe are the groupings of privacy advocates
in and among a number of countries, such as the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC) and Privacy International, whose members and spokespersons play
significant parts in pressure-group and advisory activities that flow into the shaping
of regulation.1 They have well-publicised, regular conferences and meetings (e.g.,
the annual Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference) and host active websites,
e-mail discussion and information networks and blogs. Of particular interest is the
European combination of national privacy-advocate organisations, European Dig-
ital Rights (EDRI), founded in 2002 by a few national groups and now boasting
29 privacy and civil-rights groups in 18 European countries, resulting in a signifi-
cant increase in sharing and spreading information on impending surveillance and
privacy-threatening measures, if not necessarily in lobbying power, as many of the
constituent groups operate largely independently at their own national levels. These
privacy groups overlap with a host of citizens’, consumers’ and human rights bodies
that act nationally, regionally or internationally, often concerting views and activi-
ties across national boundaries and attempting to influence policies at several levels.
Counterposed to those, of course, are groups and networks that seek to limit privacy
1 Systematic research on privacy advocates is reported in Bennett (2008).
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protection by shaping regulatory rules or instruments in ways that, they believe, will
properly minimise the impediments to the commercial or state activities that make
extensive or intensive use of personal data. Yet there are signs that, among these
mainly industrial and commercial interests, privacy and data protection are coming
to be seen as ‘good business’ and therefore as something to be accommodated and
shaped rather than resisted. Understanding all these actors’ relationships with others
in policy space and the policy-process dynamics in which they are engaged is espe-
cially important for an analytic framework that incorporates conflict and negotiation
as major processes and that does not necessarily seek to tell stories either about the
onward march of privacy protection or the inevitable erosion of privacy.
12.3 The 3D-Landscape: Multi-Level Governance?
Thus, since the inception of privacy protection as a felt responsibility of states in
regard to their citizens and inhabitants, we have been witnessing the development of
a rich but variegated pattern of connections of a variety of frequencies and densities
in and around the issues, instrumentation and practices of privacy protection. The
effectiveness of this regulatory activity is a crucial but different question that defies
attempts at measurement and evaluation, as Bennett and Raab (2006) have argued.
Be that as it may, it is nonetheless appropriate to consider how far this phenomenon
constitutes, or promotes, the institutionalisation of a multi-level governance (MLG)
infrastructure (Bache and Flinders, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2003) to regulate
information practices in line with a framework of laws, human rights and other
principles that aim at the control of surveillance (defined broadly) and the protec-
tion of privacy. To the extent that the politics of privacy protection is becoming
the international relations of privacy protection, it is open to question what the
relevant analytical frameworks or ‘theories’ may be for investigating them. MLG
seems to bridge the politics and the international relations but only systematic study
would show its usefulness or its need for modification, or perhaps rejection, for the
purpose of understanding information-policy regimes such as that for the protection
of privacy or personal data.
If one is talking about groups, networks, roles, circles, clubs, bodies and so on,
one is not necessarily talking about discrete levels in a jurisdictional or geographical
sense, although those levels are important as targets or sources of regulatory activity
and many of the policy actors can be located at one level or another. Although the
meaning of ‘level’ is far from clear in the relevant theoretical literature, ‘levels’ as a
term referring to place or jurisdiction is, in any case, too tidy a concept to embrace
activity that is so scattered in time and space and that takes place in ways that do
not conform to the nesting, hierarchical and sometimes intergovernmental-relations
implications of MLG approaches. But these implications are not intrinsic to such
approaches, although there may be some important hierarchical arrangements within
a looser set of relationships and these may properly attract the label ‘multi-level’:
for example, the formal relationship between institutions of the EU and those of
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the Member States is such that, in the privacy field, EU Directives are binding on
national governments and are supposed to generate compliant activity at that level
and within it.
Nor is it to be assumed that MLG involves only public-sector actors or organi-
sations. This is because one of the characteristics of ‘governance’ tout court is the
involvement of a mixture – obviously different in specifics within different fields –
of policy participants of varied provenance. One of the consequences of the shift
from the study of government to the study of governance is that – corresponding
to the complexity of the world – there is little collective or individual behaviour
that can be ruled out, a priori, as candidates for inclusion in accounts of the policy
processes for the particular subject at hand, whether it is the health or education
services, transport, public order – or information privacy. The involvement of stan-
dardisation bodies, technology and retail firms, or activist groups in the shaping of
regulation in the privacy field are examples of this. Other examples of a more tradi-
tional kind can be found in the privacy-related activities of individual firms nesting
within the framework of similar activity undertaken at a higher level for an industry
as a whole, such as a sectoral trade association (e.g., a direct-marketing association),
although the efficacy of such self-regulation through, for example, private-sector
industrial codes of practice, at and between private-sector levels, arouses scepticism.
In any case, the ‘governance’ part of MLG betokens a vast research endeavour, not
only to ‘name the parts’ that are involved but to comprehend their relationships and
contributions toward producing a regulatory output and outcome. As with the study
of governance in other fields and also more generally, the risk of losing sight of the
contribution and sometimes the pre-eminence, of central states is ever-present, espe-
cially if one were to adopt the unsustainable position that the Internet, for example,
is ungovernable, not least by state activity.
12.4 How Does the Landscape Function?
An important next step in analysis is to look more closely at policy actors and at their
different roles. By looking at the various roles and responsibilities that all policy
actors are given or take on themselves, we can assess any gaps in the distribution of
all aspects of privacy protection across the range of actors. Table 12.1 attempts this
in a generalised and basic fashion2:
This table does not necessarily imply that there is a strict one-to-one relation-
ship between actors and roles, nor can it show that, for the most part, there are
complex interdependencies amongst actors, just as there are for policy instruments
or tools. A more elaborate – multi-dimensional – table, including a time dimension,
would be necessary for a realistic picture of these relationships that would show how
2 Bennett and Raab (2006: 220) draw an analogous diagram of actors but do not explicitly indicate
their roles.
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Table 12.1 Actors and their privacy roles and responsibilities
Actor Responsibility
Constitution-maker Stipulate the right to privacy
Legislature Make privacy-compliant laws and data protection acts
Data protection authority Supervise and enforce compliance, encourage good
practice, raise awareness in public and politics
Court Decide cases involving privacy breaches
Government department or agency Compliance, staff training in privacy protection
Private company Compliance, staff training in privacy protection
Privacy activist organisation Campaign for privacy, propose regulations, raise public
awareness
Academic Explain privacy and data protection, discern long-term
developments
Journalist Highlight issues and events, explain policies and
developments
Consumer Protect own privacy, complain
Citizen Protect own privacy, complain
Technology developer Implement privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs),
educate IT professional staff about privacy
role-performance, for any actor, is a collaborative project. However, that is beyond
the scope of this paper.
What interests us now is a broad-brush and general assessment of actors’ actual
performance. A brief roll-call of the actors and how they perform their roles and han-
dle their responsibilities seems to suggest a fairly bleak picture. However, we must
start with a caveat about any such judgments. As Bennett and Raab (2006: Chap-
ter 9) note, the evaluation of data protection systems is no mean undertaking and is
fraught with problems of conceptualisation, criteria, evidence and measurement. As
they argue, ‘[s]ummary statements about effectiveness owe more to the discourse of
engaged policy debate and advocacy than to that of reasonably detached analysis’
(Bennett and Raab, 2006: 235). Therefore, the judgments made in this paper should
not be taken as arising from a base of systematic, intensive and extensive research,
which we cannot pretend to have; nor can we say that it exists anywhere. Moreover,
they are not tied to any specific country or data protection regime. Judgments will
also depend on the criteria or benchmarks that are chosen; these are controversial
and not universally established, and it is questionable how far they could be applied
fairly to countries and privacy regimes that reflect a great variety of histories, cul-
tures, institutional structures and values. Therefore, the remarks in this paper are
indicative best-guesses, sometimes reflecting what can be taken to be conventional
wisdom, which may stimulate not only debate but further comparative research in
depth. That said, what does the roll-call indicate?
First, constitution-makers have generally created a good basis for privacy pro-
tection by including privacy in the constitutional make-up of most national and
international legal systems. However, it should be noted that the exceptional grounds
for infringing privacy are quite broadly formulated, or at least can be interpreted
quite broadly by the courts, as in the case of Article 8 of the European Convention
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on Human Rights (ECHR), so that the actual privacy protection at the constitutional
level is not very solidly rooted. Perhaps that is inevitable, as the prevailing doctrine
is that privacy often needs to be balanced against a variety of competing rights, so
that it needs to be flexibly formulated at the constitutional level.
Be that as it may, the result is that at the level of legislatures, both national and
supranational (EU), many laws are drafted that are, even if compliant with a consti-
tution, distinctly privacy-unfriendly. The trend in many Western countries, already
visible in the 1990s and reinforced after 9/11, is that legislatures, in a piecemeal
fashion, consider privacy less important when deciding upon some anti-terrorist,
anti-crime, or public-service measure. Legislators seem to pay less attention to, and
have increasingly less patience for, the needs of privacy protection, as compared to
two or three decades ago. On the other hand, a large number of countries through-
out the world have passed significant data protection laws over the past decades
and legislatures seem to take their responsibility seriously to create a firm legal
basis for data protection in the national and supranational legal systems. One might
debate whether the actual form of the resulting data protection legislation, which
varies across countries to a significant degree within the framework of universally
respected principles, is actually the most suitable for data protection, but that is
a different issue. On balance, however, the net effect of privacy-unfriendly and of
data protection laws seems to us to be fairly limited from the perspective of privacy
protection: with considerable simplification, legislatures currently tend to attack
rather than protect privacy in legislation and it is not difficult for them to follow
populist and media demands to erode privacy in favour of, for example, security
and law enforcement purposes. Yet we should also acknowledge the argument that
even the ‘best’ data protection and privacy laws are weak instruments to regulate
technological changes that have privacy implications, sophisticated commercial uses
of personal data, government policy imperatives, and – perhaps especially – the
Internet and global information flows (Koops and Leenes, 2005).
Let us move on to consider data protection authorities (DPAs) or privacy com-
missions. As we described above, they are very active on many fronts, including in
overlapping cross-border networks and appear to work conscientiously to fulfil their
responsibilities. Having said that, one must also be critical of the DPAs’ actual effect
on privacy protection, although the fault for this may lie elsewhere, in the legisla-
tion that established their roles, responsibilities, powers and resources. Thus many
DPAs are understaffed, have too few financial and staff resources and sometimes
too few powers to be able adequately to supervise and enforce compliance with
data protection legislation. Moreover, while some DPAs focus more on supervision,
others tend to pay more attention to awareness-raising and lobbying and within the
EU, there seem to be some differences in opinion between the various DPAs on
crucial issues like transfer of Passenger Name Record data to the USA. This diver-
sity does not seem to enhance the power of the privacy supervisors in Europe – or
elsewhere – when it comes to influencing heavily politicised regulatory measures
such as the ones we mentioned. So, although DPAs are diligent, they face a difficult
job in meeting their heavy responsibility for supervising privacy compliance and for
influencing privacy debates and decision-making processes.
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Then, there are the courts. An overall impression is that the courts are not acting
as a significant or consistent protector of privacy. Partly, of course, this is caused
by the quite lenient laws that some legislatures have passed but it is also in part
owing to the infrequency of privacy-infringement cases coming before the courts.
But the latter argument may also be reversed: as long as the courts do not clearly and
seriously punish privacy infringements – and to our knowledge, there are actually
few cases in which a privacy breach led to significant civil or criminal sanctions3 –
citizens and consumers have little occasion to go to the courts if their privacy is
violated. We could also point out certain cases where the courts have done privacy a
distinct disservice; for example, Khan v. United Kingdom4 and the European Court
of Justice’s Passenger Name Record judgment5 but perhaps these are equally excep-
tional as cases that substantially punish privacy violators (cf. Bygrave, 2002 for an
overview of data protection decisions).
The next category of actors includes public and private organisations that use per-
sonal data. Are they as privacy-compliant as they should be and do they sufficiently
train their staff in privacy protection? On the whole, although these questions, as
with all others, require a depth of empirical research that is not readily available,
many would adopt a lenient stance and say that organisations are not doing a bad
job when it comes to being privacy-compliant, although almost any except the
most scrupulous organisation is bound to violate a few data protection rules. They
would argue that shortcomings should probably be blamed more on the extreme
complexity, vagueness and the absurdity of certain data protection rules in real-life
situations, than on the willingness or effort of organisations to protect personal data.
However, there are exceptions to this sanguine picture: in Europe, these might be
found perhaps somewhat more in the public than in the private sector, with certain
ministries and surveillance agencies consistently downplaying the importance of
privacy and data protection. In the United States, it is arguably in the private sector
that the most notorious privacy violators are to be found, such as certain data brokers
and search-engine providers. On the whole, we could be satisfied with the way that
most organisations live up to their privacy responsibilities, if it were not the case
that the relatively few exceptions are likely to cause a majority of privacy threats
that we face today. It should also be considered that a more nuanced evaluation
should distinguish between large and small or medium-sized companies, between
government agencies of very different kinds (e.g., some are for law enforcement,
others are for providing welfare benefits) and between different types of information
3 With the exception, of course, of physical privacy violations, like rape and burglary; our argument
here refers rather to violations of informational privacy.
4 [2000] ECHR 195 (12 May 2000). In this case, it was decided that a breach of Art. 8 ECHR (pri-
vacy) did not need to have consequences for evidence exclusion in light of Art. 6 ECHR (right to a
fair trial); the case therefore effectively condones privacy-violating behaviour by police authorities.
5 ECJ 30 May 2006, C-317/04. In this case, the – privacy-unfriendly – PNR Agreement with
the USA (Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004) was annulled on procedural grounds.
The result was that a new PNR Agreement was negotiated with the USA, which was even more
privacy-unfriendly than the first one.
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activity (e.g., simple use of data, or more sophisticated data-mining and profiling)
and different kinds of data flow (e.g., used strictly within one organisation, or shared
widely across a range of agencies).
We now come to ‘third parties’: activists, academics and the media. Most activists
are indefatigable and imaginative in approaching their tasks seriously, even against
heavy opposition and a few examples, such as EPIC, show that privacy groups can
actually make a difference in the shaping of privacy policy. However, the effective-
ness of organisations such as EPIC seems exceptional: most privacy groups have few
resources and are dependent on volunteers and good intentions rather than a solid
popular or political basis on which to build a consistent fight for privacy rights.6
Privacy activists seem particularly important in the current landscape, where privacy
is on the defensive against the threats posed by identity measures, DNA databases
and technologies for tracking and recording human movement and transactions and
needs active and perhaps combatant spokespersons, However, unless they are based
in countries like the US that have a tradition of large-scale private charity, they find
it difficult to live up to their task in countries where people are reluctant to contribute
substantial financial support.
Academics present a rather ambivalent picture. There is a fairly consistent if
rather small group of privacy academics around the world who participate in and
add to privacy debates and privacy discourse. They are based in legal, technical,
philosophical and social scientific disciplines and a number of them go beyond pri-
vacy itself to investigate surveillance and the other values that are affected by it.
Almost all of them try to explain and keep abreast of developments in privacy and
data protection and several try to influence policy by writing opinions and giving
expert statements. On the conceptual side, although 40 years of privacy research
have provided useful insight into what privacy actually is, what the relationship is
between privacy and data protection and why privacy is so important, academics
often have difficulty in getting these conceptual insights across to politicians or to
the public. This is not to criticise the academics as a group or individually: we
know from experience how hard it is to give convincing answers to the questions
raised in a language that fits the frame of reference of politicians and the public. But
academics should also realise that as long as such convincing answers, in under-
standable language, remain absent in public and policy debates, privacy is hard to
defend in the current climate. In mounting this defence, an additional problem for
many academics is that it is easy for politicians and others to point out that empirical
findings about public attitudes towards privacy invasions do not always strengthen
the case against excessive surveillance. We refer again to this below.
As to the media, the picture is also mixed. They may be part of the solution but
they are certainly part of the problem, as privacy invasion by the media into the lives
of celebrities as well as ‘ordinary’ people seems to sell papers and boost ratings.
6 An illustrative example is the Dutch group Bits of Freedom, which for several years was one of
the most well-informed and vociferous groups in Europe but which had to be disbanded for lack
of funding in 2006.
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The popularity of the ‘big brother’ television series also attests to the profits to be
gained from lives lived in a goldfish bowl. With a few exceptions, most media tend
to neglect or downplay privacy as an issue, and particularly the tabloid press and
popular commercial television broadcasters have a tradition of not taking privacy
seriously in the context of policy issues where ‘security’ is an overriding concern.
But the ‘quality press’ has a somewhat different tradition and seems to have taken
up privacy as an issue that is worthy of news and of concern. Over the past year
or two, a shift seems to be slowly taking place, from privacy as a culprit in an ‘If-
you-have-nothing-to-hide, you-have-nothing-to fear’ discourse (cf. Solove, 2007)
towards privacy as a vulnerable good in a ‘surveillance society’ discourse. This only
occurs in a small part of the media, albeit in some of the more influential ones but it
may be a significant development that indicates that some journalists are shouldering
their responsibility in noticing and critically describing societal developments, in
this case, the threat to privacy of the increasingly surveilled Western society.
What can be said about the privacy bearers themselves: citizens and consumers
as ‘data subjects’? They are, to a certain extent, responsible for protecting their
own privacy – the proverbial closing of the curtains if they want to hide in-house
activity. In some ways, quite a number of citizens certainly do protect their privacy
as far as it lies in their power to do so. However, most citizens have little notion of
the threats to their privacy that current society poses, particularly since privacy is
increasingly infringed by covert, complex and distant technological applications of
which citizens have little knowledge. Moreover, many of these technologies cannot
be blocked by closing curtains – the counter-technologies, if they exist, lie beyond
the power (both in terms of awareness and of availability and cost) of most citizens
to apply; many of them must be built into the design of technologies in ways that
citizens cannot control.
On top of this, citizens in general do not have as high a regard for privacy as
they had a few decades ago, for example, in discussions and surveys about ‘security
versus privacy’. The ‘I have nothing to hide’ mantra is often heard – and used by
politicians to pass privacy-infringing laws – because many citizens seem to think
it unproblematic to decrease privacy by measures aimed at solving crimes and pre-
venting terrorism, on the – erroneous – assumption that the measures will be applied
to criminals and terrorists but not to themselves, since they are doing nothing wrong
(cf. Solove, 2007). They do not realise that the enhanced surveillance measures
often target the population at large and scan unsuspected, ordinary citizens for pos-
sible ‘uncommon’ behaviour that matches ‘risk profiles’. What holds for persons as
citizens applies more or less equally to them as consumers. Perhaps consumers are,
generally, even less concerned over privacy than citizens are, since they see immedi-
ate benefits of providing personal data to businesses and hardly any threats of abuse
of these data, apart from perhaps being pestered by direct marketing, which is hardly
threatening to most people. As a result of the relatively low privacy-awareness and
privacy appreciation of citizens and consumers and the consequent ease with which
they accept infringements, both actual and potential, of their privacy, the protection
of privacy as a core value of society is not particularly advanced, and possibly even
weakened, by the privacy bearers themselves.
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Then, there is the final actor on our stage: the technology developers. It is
commonly assumed that they have no responsibility for privacy protection and it
is therefore usually considered that they make no effort to make the technology
they develop more privacy-friendly, or at least less privacy-threatening. Although
academic literature has started to suggest that, in order to keep privacy alive, privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) must be used (Lessig, 1999), there is a long way to
go before this suggestion will be fully listened to and accepted in the community of
technology developers. The attempts to develop and market PETs so far have largely
been made by privacy activists, lobby groups, DPAs, or other privacy protectors,
with the help of technology developers working in commission but there are only
infrequent indications that technology industries are aware of a need or value to
pay attention to privacy in the development process. Although a ‘business case’ for
privacy protection can be made, such an enlightened approach is not common; nor is
privacy protection, apart from data security – which is, of course, highly important –
sufficiently incorporated into public procurement processes. As a consequence, most
technology that emerges on the market enables privacy infringement much more
than privacy protection, since technology tends to facilitate data collection and
merging rather than data shielding (Koops and Leenes, 2005).
12.5 Conclusion
We have mapped the landscape of privacy actors, showing a remarkable range
of diverse and versatile actors with many potential interconnections and interre-
lationships. This suggests that privacy is an object of much attention, action and
policy-making and there is indeed an impressive range of activities developed by
the array of actors. At the same time – although we must repeat our caveat that
empirical research is lacking here – a roll-call of actors to survey the way in which
each responds to and deals with privacy should not make us optimistic that privacy
is well protected across the board. Many actors are diligent and make good efforts to
protect privacy, although they often face not only resource limitations that limit their
success but also public, commercial and political indifference or hostility. More-
over, quite a number of actors seem to pay less attention to privacy than it deserves,
perhaps through an underrating or lack of understanding of its value.
Overall, the cast of privacy actors, despite (or perhaps because of?) the many
interconnecting and co-operative roads, gives the impression of being too varied and
too fragmented to be able to function well. Since there are so many actors, each with
her own responsibility, the risk looms large that each individual actor downplays
her own responsibility. Pluralism of regulatory activity is one thing but dilution is
the other side of the coin, particularly if there is no director to guide the actors.
Individual activities are likely to fail to achieve the available synergies without a
strategy that cumulates them into a joint performance that achieves its goal.
If privacy is to be adequately protected – and it is vital for society that it is – some
shifts may have to be made among the company of players; we only highlight a few
here. The actors could do with better direction and a better script, which emphasises
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the characteristics of an overall ‘play’, or regime, beyond the individual characters
and their performances. The government is probably the most important actor to take
on more responsibility for championing privacy: they can strengthen its presence
in policies, provide more funds to privacy-protecting actors, sharpen and orches-
trate the implementation of privacy instruments and co-ordinate and facilitate joint
policies and activities. In present and foreseeable political circumstances, however,
governments are unlikely to be able to perform these regime-sustaining tasks and
international or global governance structures are still embryonic and intermittent.
A shift is probably also needed in the responsibilities of technology developers: as
long as they are able to dismiss privacy as something that ‘society’ should take care
of once their technology emerges on the market, privacy-threatening technologies
will continue to be developed, marketed and applied, with few countervailing tech-
nologies that can protect privacy. PETs should be taken seriously as a stronghold
in the privacy landscape but they can only become a success if privacy aware-
ness and appreciation become ingrained in the minds of technology developers
and embedded in business and governmental decisions and requirements. A more
privacy-supportive public opinion is also necessary but there are no clear signs of
its emergence despite occasional promising fluctuations. In short, there are many
challenges that privacy research, policy and practice face and they are likely to keep
us busy in the coming years.
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